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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SARAH MARGARET DeWEESE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8347 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for 
a fall in the entranceway of the J. C. Penney store at 213 
South Main Street in Salt Lake City on November 3 0, 
19 53. The case was tried before a jury in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, with the Honorable Martin M. Larson 
presiding. After plaintiff had introduced her evidence 
and rested, the court reserved its ruling on defendant's 
motion for an invoiuntary dismissal. After defendant 
had introduced its evidence, the court reserved its ruling 
on defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The case 
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was submitted to the jury, a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the defendant was returned by them in 
the amount of $10,000.00, and judgment was entered ac-
cordingly. Thereafter, defendant moved the court for a 
new trial or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict 
and enter judgment in accordance with its motion for a 
directed verdict theretofore reserved by the court. These 
motions were both denied by the court. 
Sarah Margaret DeWeese was 27 years old at the time 
of the trial. On November 30, 1953, she left her home 
at 1275 Emerson Avenue in Salt Lake City to go to town 
to do some shopping and to meet her husband who was 
scheduled to get off work between 9:15 and 9:30 P.M. 
Her husband, Hugh DeWeese, was Assistant Manager of 
the W. T. Grant store located at 241 South Main Street 
in Salt Lake City. She was wearing regular winter ap-
parel but was not wearing any galoshes or overshoes. 
(R. 17). She caught the bus at 13th East and Emerson 
Avenue at 8:00 P. M. and at that time the weather was 
fair, with no precipitation. After she had traveled about 
one block or maybe a block and one-half snow began to 
fall in large flakes, melting before it hit the ground. She 
got off the bus at 2nd South and State Streets and the 
weather was the same but there was no snow on the 
ground. The sidewalks were damp and wet but not wet 
enough for any water to be running on them (R. 18) and 
there were no puddles unless there was a break in the side-
walk. (R. 35) She went directly to the J. C. Penney 
store. 
The floor of the entrance to the store consisted of 
terrazzo and she entered from the north side. (R. 19-20) 
She noticed the floor was wet and muddy and footprints 
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or streaks from people walking in and out. (R. 20, 39) 
There was no water puddled or running (R. 42) but she 
never thought about it being slick or anything of that 
nature. (R. 20) She was not looking up or down. (R. 30) 
The entrance was lighted and she could see where she was 
going. (R. 28) She was from two to five feet from the 
sidewalk when her right foot went forward and her left 
leg folded under her and she fell. A customer helped her 
up and she went into the store. She called her husband 
at the W. T. Grant store and he came to defendant's 
store immediately. A Mr. Davies, an employee of the 
store, arrived and asked her if there were any mats in the 
entrance. She told him no and he went out to the en-
trance, returned and got a bucket and went outside and 
put what appeared to be Feldspar on the entranceway. 
The accident occurred around 8:15 or 8:20 P.M. She 
was in the J. C. Penney store approximately 15 to 20 min-
utes and went from there toW. T. Grant's store. (R. 21-
22) When she went out of the store there were no mats 
in the entranceway. 
The entranceway where plaintiff fell had a slope of 
4 inches to 10 feet. The sidewalk in front of the store 
had a slope of 5.5 inches to 10 feet. (R. 29) She left W. 
T. Grant's store with her husband between 9:15 and 9:30 
and the weather and the sidewalks were about the same 
as when she fell. 
Over objection of the defendant, plaintiff's husband 
was allowed to testify that he married plaintiff on Novem-
ber 4, 1950 in Roanoke, Virginia. He had been raised 
there and was first employed in Postal Service at the age 
of 18, subsequently going to the U. S. Army, attending 
college and then returning to the Post Office, after which 
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he went to work as a Trainee Manager for W. T. Grant 
Company. (R. 66-67) With W. T. Grant Company he 
had duties to perform in connection with the maintenance 
and upkeep of the entrances to the store, which were of 
terrazzo. Thereafter he worked for the same company in 
Greensboro, North Carolina, Richmond, Virginia, Wil-
liamsburg, Virginia, Winchester, Virginia, Newport News, 
Virginia, Atlanta, Georgia and Salt Lake City, at all of 
which places they had terrazzo entranceways and he had 
duties relative to the upkeep and maintenance of the same. 
(R. 67-70) 
On the 30th day of November, 1953, the following 
precipitation amounting to .02 inches was received in Salt 
Lake City: 
((Light rain started at 8:12P.M., ended at 8:34P.M. 
Very light rain started at 9:15 P.M., ended at 9:31 
P.M. 
Light rain started at 9:31, ended at 10:59 P.M. 
Light snow started at 10:45 P.M., ended at 11:00 
P.M. 
Very light rain started at 10:59 P.M., ended at 
11:35 P.M. 
Very light snow started at 11:05 P.M., ended at 
11:3 6 P.M." (Exhibit 4-P). 
The temperature on November 30th was a maxi-
mum of 62 and a minimum of 39, which maximum tied 
the previous record for this day and was the warmest 
November since records began in 1874. On the 30th of 
November, 1953 there was only a trace of precipitation at 
9 o'clock and a trace is an amount too small to measure. 
(Ex. 5-D) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE 
TRIAL TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IMPROPER 
EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL. 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE 
TRIAL TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY. 
Plaintiff predicated her right to recover solely upon 
the following two allegations of negligence contained in 
the complaint: 
(((a) That defendant constructed the en-
tranceway to its store with a terrazzo surface and 
on an inclining plane at a time when it well knew, 
or should have known, that said surface had the 
propensity of becoming slick and slippery when 
wet. 
(( (b) Defendant failed and neglected to place 
any abrasives or rubber matting on said entrance-
way at a time when it well knew, or should have 
known, that said entranceway had become slick 
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and slippery as a result of inclement weather." 
(R. 2) 
There was no evidence introduced at the trial in sup-
port of the first allegation and the court did not submit 
such a question to the jury. The mere fact that an in-
cline or slope existed cannot sustain any charge of negli-
gence. However, the only evidence introduced at the 
trial showed that the slope was in fact less than that of 
the sidewalk itself in front of and adjoining the entrance-
way. The general rule is well stated in Shearman & Red-
field on Negligence, Revised Edition, Vol. 4, Sec. 798, 
page 1824: 
uBut there is no inherently dangerous con-
struction merely because the marble floor of an 
entranceway to a store has a slanting or sloping 
surface." 
One of plaintiff's witness also testified that this typ~ 
of entrance was in common use to the extent of approxi-
mately 8 0% of the business establishments on Main Street. 
The duty of care controlling in this case has been 
fully set out by this court. In Jenson v. S.H. Kress & 
Compa.ny, 87 Ut. 434, 49 P.2d 958 (1935), this court 
held that a storekeeper's duty was to exercise ordinary 
care and diligence to provide and maintain a reasonably 
safe place of business for its customers and to exercise 
the same degree of care ana diligence to prevent injury 
to them and to their property while they are lawfully 
in its place of business or on the premises. This court 
also held that a storekeeper is not an insurer of the safety 
of its customers. This rule of law has been reaffirmed by 
this court in the case of Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 
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177, where the court said: 
u::- )(- ::- In the instant case the appellant can 
only be liable if the terrazzo floor when wet sub-
jected business visitors to an unreasonable risk and 
the appellant either knew or by the exercise of rea-
sonable care could have discovered that such a 
condition existed. ::- * *" 
Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to 
plaintiff, we respectfully submit that reasonable minds 
could not differ that the floor upon which plaintiff fell 
did not subject her to an unreasonable risk and that the 
defendant did not know, and by the exercise of reason-
able care could not have discovered, that any hazard ex-
isted. 
First and foremost, the record does not support the 
charge that the entranceway had become slippery. Mrs. 
DeWeese stated: 
etA. I was just walking along normally, minding 
my own business, and I noticed the floor was 
wet, but never thought about it being slick 
or anything like that. 
ttQ. And what happened? 
etA. And the next thing I knew, I was down after 
I had gone two or three feet ip.side the en-
trance." ( R. 2 0) 
Mr. Caffall, one of the plaintiff's witnesses, testified 
that he did not test the terrazzo at J. C. Penney's for 
slipperiness when it was wet. (R. 100) He also testified 
that a lot of differences existed in various terrazzo (R. 95) 
and that terrazzo when wet was just about as slippery as 
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the sidewalk. All of plaintiff's evidence introduced in an 
attempt to show possible slipperiness was related to the 
terrazzo in front of W. T. Grant's store or in theW. T. 
Grant's stores in Roanoke, Virginia, Greensboro, North 
Carolina, Richmond, Virginia, Williamsburg, Virginia, 
Winchester, Virginia, Newport News, Virginia and At-
lanta, Georgia. As will be hereinafter pointed out, the 
terrazzo or its condition in the entranceways to these 
other stores was inadmissible and had no probative value 
relative to the terrazzo in front of the defendant's store. 
Admittedly, Mr. DeWeese testified that he almost fell, 
but he was in a hurry and he was not walking in a normal 
manner nor as his wife had been walking, nor in the same 
place. 
The only affirmative evidence introduced relevant 
to the terrazzo in the entranceway of defendant's store 
was by the defendant, whose witness, Dr. Harris, testified 
from actual measurements made of the static and kinetic 
coefficients of friction of the terrazzo where Mrs. De-
Weese fell. This testimony was to the effect that, first, 
it was not more slippery when wet than dry; second, it 
was less slippery when worn, and, third, it was about as 
slippery when wet as the sidewalk in front of the store. 
(R. 110-119) 
Reasonable minds cannot differ in concluding that 
defendant did not know, nor by the exercise of reason-
able care could it have discovered, any alleged hazardous 
condition. 
The time element in this case is startling. This acci-
dent, by plaintiff's own testimony, happened around 8:15 
or 8:20 P.M. Her husband corroborated this by his testi-
mony. After plaintiff had fallen, been helped up, had 
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gone into defendant's store and then called her husband 
at W. T. Grant's store, he arrived at J. C. Penney's store 
between 8:15 and 8:30 P.M. Plaintiff also introduced the 
weather report, showing: "Light rain started at 8:12P.M., 
ended at 8:34 P.M." (Ex. 4-P) 
Plaintiff's testimony that it had begun to snow short-
ly after she boarded the bus at 13th East and Emerson, is 
not inconsistent, for this court can take judicial notice 
that precipitation could have begun at the higher elevation 
of 13th East before any precipitation began in town. The 
only evidence of any precipitation in town other than 
the weather report was plaintiff's testimony of precipita-
tion during the time it took her to walk from 2nd South 
and State Streets to defendant's store, less than a block 
and a half away. 
The month of November had been the warmest 
November since weather records began in 1874. No pre-
cipitation had fallen during the previous five days, and, in 
fact, only five days out of the entire month showed any 
precipitation at all. (Ex. 5-D) The uncontroverted evi-
dence is that on the evening Mrs. DeWeese fell precipita-
tion began at 8:12 P.M., with just a trace falling from 
that time until 8:34 P.M. The weather report shows all 
precipitation to be very light and intermittent, and Mrs. 
DeWeese properly categorized it as a ((mist," (R. 36) cer-
tainly not enough to cause the sidewalks to run water or 
collect puddles, and the only moisture in defendant's 
covered foyer was placed there during a period of not less 
than three nor more than eight minutes prior to plain-
tiff's fall and consisted of streaks or marks from people's 
feet. These did not extend into the store beyond where 
Mrs. DeWeese fell. 
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We submit that to hold a store owner to a standard 
of care imposing constructive notice or knowledge of a 
purportedly but not proven slippery condition in a cov-
ered entranceway, which could not have been in existence 
for more than approximately five minutes, is unreason-
able and would in effect require that defendant be an in-
surer of its customers' safety. Such a rule is contrary to 
the law in this state and the overwhelming rule of law 
in the United States. Jenson v. S. H. Kress Co., supra; 
Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., supra. 
The Supreme Court of Washington in Knopp, etal. v. 
Kemp & Hebert, 74 P.2d 924, (S.Ct. Washington, 1938), 
in affirming a judgment on a directed verdict for the 
defendant department store, declared: 
u* ~- * At any event, there is evidence that the 
sidewalk in front of the store was wet and some of 
the slush or water had slopped over on the terrazzo 
floor where it joined the cement sidewalk. As Mrs. 
Knopp stepped on the terraza [sic.], she slipped and 
fell on her right side, seriously injuring her upper 
right arm and her right shoulder." 
((The decisions of this court, as well as the 
decisions of other courts, have very generally de-
nied recovery in cases where persons have fallen on 
smooth floors even when they are made slippery by 
the presence of wax or water. A great many of 
these cases are collected and discussed in Shumaker 
v. Charada Investment Co., 183 Wash. 521,49 P.2d 
44. Among the cases there cited is Kresge Co. v. 
Fader, 116 Ohio St. 718, 158 N. E. 174, 175, 58 
A.L.R. 132, from which we quote as follows: tit 
is a fact known to all that many stores in all 
branches of trade have an inside door or passageway 
into the store, usually in the middle of the front. 
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On each side of this passageway is a display win-
dow. The passage then extends back ten or twelve 
feet or more to the entrance door to the store. This 
passage usually has a slight slope from the door to 
the sidewalk, at which line there is no door. This 
slope is to carry away the rain that may blow into 
the passageway. The passageway is in fact practi-
cally a part of the sidewalk, but at the same time 
it is within the front line of the store, and under 
control of the store. Would any one contend that, 
if a person walked into such passageway when it 
was raining, and there slipped and fell, he could 
recover damages because there was moisture on the 
floor of the passageway? Manifestly not. Every-
body knows that, when people are entering any 
building when it is raining, they will carry some 
moisture on their feet, which will render the floor 
near the door on the inside damp to some extent, 
and every one knows that a damp floor is likely 
to be a little more slippery than a dry floor. In 
this instance Mrs. Fader knew that her own shoes 
were wet when she went in there out of the rain-
storm, and after walking on the wet sidewalk. Two 
of her companions who preceded her crossed the 
same wet spot as she did, and did not fall, and the 
one of them who testified in the case said that he 
did not turn and warn her about the wet spot, as 
there was nothing about it to indicate to him that 
it presented any danger-a very frank and a very 
natural statement.' 
((See, also, Cornwell v. S. S. Kresge Co., 112 
W. Va. 237, 164 S.E. 156; Picman v. Higbee Co., 
54 Ohio App. 55, 6 N.E.2d 21; Anderson v. Seattle 
Park Co., 79 Wash. 575, 140 P. 698; Mullen v. 
Sensenbrenner Mercantile Co., Mo. Sup., 260 S.W. 
982, 33 A.L.R. 176. 
HW alking, although it becomes automatic by 
long practice and use, is, after all, a highly compli-
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cated process. The body balance is maintained by 
the co-ordination of many muscles, and their op-
eration is controlled by an intricate system of 
motor nerves, the failure of any of which for a 
split second, on account of advancing age or for 
some other reason, may cause a fall. It is cotnmon 
knowledge that people fall on the best of sidewalks 
and floors. A fall, therefore, does not, of itself, 
tend to prove that the surface over which one is 
walking is dangerously unfit for the purpose." 
To the same effect the Circuit Court of Appeals of 
the Tenth Circuit, in the case of Sears Roebuck & Co. v. 
Johnson, 91 F.2d 332, reversed a judgment for the plain-
tiff, who had slipped on an allegedly wet and therefore 
slippery floor of defendant's store, saying: 
((From the record, it appears that when it is 
raining in said city, some water is usually carried 
into stores by parties going in and out, and that 
those coming in from without on a wet day have 
wet shoes. 
((It is just as reasonable to infer that plaintiff 
slipped because of wet shoes as on account of a 
damp floor. 
((Under either theory, the evidence is insuffi-
cient to make an issue as to negligence on the part 
of defendant. The conditions complained of were 
not shown to have existed for any length of time. 
Whilst there is evidence that it was raining around 
9:30 and 10 o'clock in the morning, its extent is 
not stated although plaintiff should have been able 
to state the extent. 
((As to what period during the rain it was 
sufficient to wet the streets so that the shoes of 
persons entering the store would carry in water or 
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mud, if at all, is not disclosed. The rain in the 
beginning may have been merely a drizzle and 
have gradually increased. So you cannot point out 
with any reasonable certainty as to when or how 
long, if at all, that floor was sufficiently wet as to 
place the defendant on notice that it should receive 
attention by mopping or otherwise. 
((There was no evidence on part of plaintiff 
that her shoes were not wet, and that information 
was peculiarly within her knowledge." 
((The fact that invitee may have slipped on the 
floor of the store did not shift to defendant burden 
of establishing that accident did not occur through 
its negligence, nor create presumption of negli-
gence. The presumption is that defendant exer-
cised reasonable care, as respects liability for in-
jury to plaintiff on account of slipping on floor. 
Defendant was not an insurer against accidents to 
persons entering the store for making purchases or 
otherwise on invitation." 
In Parsons v. H. L. Green Co., 10 N.W.2d 40, the 
defendant store was charged with a slippery and unsafe 
condition due to water, slush, snow and mud being al-
lowed to collect and which condition defendant knew or 
should have known existed. In affirming a directed ver-
dict for the defendant store the Supreme Court of Iowa 
stated: 
((* ::- ::· We cannot say that a failure to follow 
and remove immediately every deposit of snow that 
is brought into a building can reasonably be held 
to be a breach of duty which the inviter owes to 
an invitee and so constitutes negligence. Such is 
not the holding of the courts where this question 
has arisen. To so require would demand an exer-
cise of such extra-ordinary care as to be unrea-
sonable." 
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tt* * * In order that there shall be liability, 
there must be some evidence of notice of the exist-
ing condition, either actual or constructive, and in 
such time that the defendant in the exercise of 
ordinary care could have remedied it. Snipps v. 
Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 164 Iowa 530, 146 
N.W. 468, and cases cited. No evidence of such 
knowledge appears in the record." 
In Brunet v. S. S. Kresge Co., 115 F.2d 713, the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed 
the foregoing general rule: 
HW e think the facts as proved by appellee fail 
to disclose such a lack of reasonable and ordinary 
care in the maintenance and supervision of the 
premises as to render appellant liable for her acci-
dent. In the words of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in another case in-
volving a fall on rather dark stairs wet from 
tracked-in water: 
tt (If what was shown in this case was suffi-
cient to permit recovery, it would require store 
owners to have a mopper stationed at the doors 
on rainy days for the sole purpose of mopping up 
after every customer entering or leaving the 
premises. Every store owner would be required to 
be an insurer against such accidents to public in-
vitees who came in on rainy days with wet shoes.' 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson, 91 F.2d 332, 
3 39." 
Also, in Gallagher v. Children's Aid Soc. of Pennsyl-
vania and Philadelphia, 23 A.2d 452, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, in affirming a nonsuit, where the plaintiff 
fell due to wet condition in defendant's office building, 
said: 
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HThe case falls within the familiar rule that 
negligence cannot be inferred from the mere hap-
pening of an accident. Hulmes v. Keel, 335 Pa. 
117, 119, 6 A.2d 64. The mere happening of an 
accident does not show that one party or the other 
was at fault. McAvoy v. Kromer, 277 Pa. 196, 
120 A. 762. Plaintiff's proofs were also deficient 
in that she failed to show that the condition of 
which she complained had existed for an unrea-
sonable length of time so that defendant was put 
on notice. MacDonald v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 321 
Pa. 25, 183 A. 804; Bremer v. W. W. Smith, Inc., 
126 Pa.Super. 408, 411, 191 A. 395; Restatement, 
Torts, Sec. 343." 
See also: Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Lamberson, 
144 F.2d 97, (C.C.A. 9th, 1944); Lander v. Sears Roe-
buck & Co., 44 A.2d 886 (S.Ct. Me., 1945); Dudley v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 192 P.2d 617 (S.Ct. Wyoming, 
1948); Bersch v. Holton Street State Bank, 19 N.W.2d 
175 (S.Ct.Wis., 1945); Spaulding v. Christakos, 68 N.E. 
2d 55 (Ct. of App., N.Y., 1946) ; Grace v. Jordan Marsh 
Co., 59 N.E.2d 283 (S.Ct., Mass., 1945). 
A general rule of law is stated by Shearman & Red-
field on Negligence, Revised Edition, Vol. 4, Sec. 798 at 
page 1826: 
((Water, slush and mud, tracked in upon a 
floor by reason of weather conditions outside, al-
though it renders the floor wet, dirty and slippery, 
does not ordinarily create an actionable situation. 
A wet and sloppy condition of the floor may be 
necessarily incidental to the business or activity in 
question." 
This court has distinguished the case of Erickson v. 
Walgreen Drug Co., supra, in the case of Lindsay v. Ec-
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cles Hotel Co-mpany, ________________ Ut. ________________ , 284 P.2d 
477: 
u* * * In other words, there was no evidence 
as to how the water got onto the floor, by whom 
it was deposited, exactly when it arrived there or 
that the defendant had knowledge of its presence. 
Under such circumstances, a jury cannot be per-
mitted to speculate that the defendant was negli-
gent. A reading of plaintiff's authority makes 
obvious the factual differences between that case 
and its inapplicability to the one here." (Italics 
ours) 
There is no probative evidence in the record suffi-, 
cient to establish that defendant knew or should have 
known of any condition alleged by plaintiff to have ex-. 
isted, or that such a condition had existed for such an un-1 
reasonable length of time that defendant was put on no-
tice thereof. 
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POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUlL TY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff testified that when she walked into the en-
tranceway of defendant's store, 
ttA. I was just walking along normally, minding 
my own business, and I noticed the floor was 
wet, but never thought about it being slick 
or anything like that. 
HQ. And what happened? 
HA. And the next thing I knew, I was down after 
I had gone two or three feet inside the en-
trance." (R. 20) 
The foyer was lighted. As pointed out above, there 
was no affirmative evidence of any condition existing in 
the entranceway. Any contention that the entranceway 
was slippery, because common knowledge is alleged to 
provide the information that terrazzo is slippery when 
wet, charges plaintiff with that knowledge as equally as 
the defendant. She was married to an Assistant Manager 
of a store, who professed to know the propensities of 
terrazzo and who testified that W. T. Grant's terrazzo in 
all of the stores he worked was slippery when wet. The 
plain fact is that she didn't think it was wet enough to 
be dangerous (and it wasn't) and yet she seeks to hold 
J. C. Penney for what they should have known was dan-
gerous. If she maintains that a reasonable, prudent per-
son would or could have recognized a dangerous condi-
tion, she thereby excludes herself from such a reasonable, 
prudent category and convicts herself of contributory 
negligence. She wore no galoshes, she recognized that 
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precipitation did not begin until she was on her way to 
town and that the sidewalks were damp only, with no 
water in puddles or running on it. What she demands is 
knowledge of or notice to defendant, should also be 
knowledge or notice to herself. See Brunet v. S. S. Kresge, 
supra, where the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit stated: 
u tFrom the testimony of the plaintiff it is 
apparent that the danger, if any, was clearly evi-
dent to her, as well as the defendants, and that 
she was aware of the condition and of the possi-
bility of sustaining a fall before she undertook to 
pass over and along the floor space of the vestibule. 
tt tThe condition described by the witnesses is 
one that is not only not unusual, but is customarily 
to be found on such days as described in the testi-
mony, in vestibules of this character and the side-
walks and the premises surrounding entrances to 
public places.* * * 
u tin the case at bar the plaintiff was as well 
apprised of the condition existing in the vestibule 
as the defendant, and should be held to as high a 
degree of care for her own safety as would be re-
quired of the defendant.'" 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IMPROPER 
EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL. 
The record reveals that plaintiff sought to influence 
the jury by a constant and persistent line of questions and 
testimony relating to the practice, custom and condi-
tions of W. T. Grant stores in various localities in the 
United States as well as Salt Lake. The beginning ques-
tion was categorized by counsel as ((preliminary," and 
then boldly asserted to be admissible as a standard of care: 
uMR. BLACK. If your Honor, please, this has 
to do with a standard of care-this is evidence of a 
standard of care in connection with maintenance 
and upkeep of terrazzo entrance-way. 
((MR. AADNESEN: Just a minute, I object-
HTHE COURT: Just a minute, no argu-
ment-
HMR. AADNESEN: -object to the speech. 
HTHE COURT: It may be evidence of a 
standard of care that W. T. Grant takes, but I 
don't see how it could be anything else." (R. 71) 
In spite of some adverse rulings of the court an4 
much discussion regarding the objectionable nature of the 
questions, the line of questioning persisted until the pat-
tern and effect became clearly prejudicial to the defend-
ant. Mr. DeWeese was both directly and indirectly al-
lowed to set a standard of care by comparison. Admitted-
ly the defendant, J. C. Penney Company, used mats and 
Feldspar during inclement weather, just as they were used 
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by other stores on Main Street, including W. T. Grants. 
But the implication arose that if W. T. Grants store had 
placed mats in their entranceway at any given time, the 
defendant J. C. Penney store was negligent in not having 
also placed mats or used Feldspar in its entranceway. This 
in effect was an attempt to charge the defendant, J. C. 
Penney store, with constructive knowledge of a condition 
existing on the premises of theW. T. Grant store. There 
was no showing of similarity of conditions, which might 
have provided some small glimmer of relevancy or mate-
riality of such evidence. Rather, Mr. Caffall testified that 
the terrazzo at the W. T. Grant store was different in 
composition than that at the defendant's store. The fact 
that defendant's entrance was a covered foyer, while 
W. T. Grant's entranceway might have been quite as 
fully exposed as the sidewalk to inclement weather (which 
casual observance reveals) , was not considered nor prof-
fered. 
It is evident from the complaint filed by the plain-
tiff and from the evidence introduced by her, that the 
defendant's store was not charged with failure to possess 
mats or Feldspar or to accede to any custom or usage 
thereof-but with failure to put such out at a time the 
defendant's store purportedly knew or should have known 
such were required. To attempt to establish such a stand-
ard of care by comparison is contrary to the law of this 
state and the overwhelming general rule of law in the 
United States. Such a standard is a substantive rule of 
law to be determined by the court. This is well stated 
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 
the case o(Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 
F.2d 836: 
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((If the evidence is admitted and the jury is 
admonished, either at the time it is admitted or by 
proper instruction in connection with its admis-
sion, that it was admitted merely to show what pre-
cautions were generally taken in such cases as 
bearing upon the degree of care enjoined upon the 
defendant by his relationship to the plaintiff, we 
think the evidence is admissible for this purpose. 
Pence v. California Mining Company, 27 Utah 
378, 75 P. 934. To this extent it is not admitted 
for the purpose of showing a custom or to estab-
lish a rule of conduct by com-Parison." (Italics 
ours) 
((~- ~- ~~ If the introduction of the testimony 
would result in a confusion of issues, or inject many 
new controversial points collateral to the issues, 
or if it would tend to generate surprise, or undue 
prejudice disproportionate to the usefulness of the 
evidence, it should not be admitted." 
The testimony admitted in evidence was not ex-
plained by the court as to its purpose, nor was it com-
mented on in the instructions. The foregoing standard 
of care is discussed by the court in Chesapeake & 0. Ry. 
Co. v. Bryant's Admr., 114 S. W.2d 89, at page 92: 
tt:-.. ~- ~- The standard is a matter of law, not of 
fact. If the presence or absence of a duty to the 
plaintiff were left to the judgment of a jury, no 
defendant could be held to know in advance the 
duties required of him. 
((Holmes points out that the law has not only 
fixed general standards, but, where the courts have 
felt themselves on safe ground, specific standards 
for particular circumstances. He continues: 
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u elf, now, the ordinary liabilities in tort arise 
from the failure to comply with fixed and uniform 
standards of external conduct, which every man 
is presumed and required to know, it is obvious that 
it ought to be possible, sooner or later, to formulate 
these standards at least to some extent, and that 
to do so must at last be the business of the court. 
It is equally clear that the featureless generality, 
that the defendant was bound to use such care as a 
prudent man would do under the circumstances, 
ought to be continually giving place to the specific 
one, that he was bound to use this or that precau-
tion under these or those circumstances. The 
standard which the defendant was bound to come 
up to was a standard of specific acts or omissions, 
with reference to the specific circumstances in 
which he found himself. If in the whole depart-
ment of unintentional wrongs the courts arrived 
at no further utterance than the question of negli-
gence, and left every case, without rudder or com-
pass, to the jury, they would simply confess their 
inability to state a very large part of the law which 
they required the defendant to know, and would 
assert, by implication, that nothing could be 
learned by experience. But neither courts nor 
legislatures have ever stopped at that point. 
cc cFrom the time of Alfred to the present day, 
statutes and decisions have busied themselves with 
defining the precautions to be taken in certain 
familiar cases; that is, with substituting for the 
vague test of the care exercised by a prudent man, 
a precise one of specific acts or omissions. The 
fundamental thought is still the same, that the way 
prescribed is that in which prudent men are in the 
habit of acting, or else is one laid down for cases 
where prudent men might otherwise be in doubt.' " 
Testimony admitted at the trial and persisted in by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
questions which imported the purpose therefor, appears 
in such abundance in the record that it would unduly 
encumber this brief to duplicate it here. Specifically, the 
thirteen pages of testimony of Hugh DeWeese, from pages 
66 to 79 in the record, illustrate the pattern of the ques-
tions and contain the objectionable questions and answers. 
This pattern is further illustrated by the testimony of 
Frank Ca:tliall on pages 97 and 98 of the record: 
t(Q. Have you made a particular examination at 
my request of the terrazzo entrance-way to 
W. T. Grant and Company? 
((A. Yes. 
t(Q. Can you state, from your observation of that 
entrance-way whether there is carborundum 
and a London grit in that? 
uMR. AADNESEN: Object to it as immaterial. 
uTHE COURT: He may answer that with a eyes' 
or (no'. Doesn't ask him whether there is or 
not. 
uQ. Did you make an observation on that? 
((A. Yes. 
ceQ. What did your observation reveal? 
uMR. AADNESEN: Object to it, your Honor, as 
immaterial. 
uA. Do you mean as to the-
((MR. AADNESEN: My objection-just a mo-
ment-
uTHE COURT: I think the question is objection-
able in the form it is asked. 
ceQ. Did you observe whether that substance had 
an abrasive in it-that terrazzo surface at 
W. T. Grant's? 
uMR. AADNESEN: Object to it again as immate-
rial. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
((THE COURT: He may answer that. 
HQ. Will you answer, please? 
((A. The material that is in there-
HTHE COURT: That may be answered with eyes' 
or (no'. 
etA. Oh, eyes' or cno'? 
HQ. Did you make that observation? 
ccA. Yes. 
ceQ. What did that observation reveal? 
((MR. AADNESEN: That's what my objection 
goes to, your Honor. 
((THE COURT: He may answer that. 
ccA. The floor that is in there now has carborun-
dum on it; the border-
ceQ. You are talking about J. C. Penney's entrance 
now, aren't you? 
((A. Yes. 
ceQ. I am talking about W. T. Grant-entrance to 
Grant's store at the present time, Mr. Caffall. 
etA. Oh, yes, that has London grits in it. 
HQ. How much does it have in it? 
ccA. I couldn't tell the percentage-quite a lot of 
it. 
((MR. AADNESEN: May my record show that 
my objection goes to this entire line as to 
what W. T. Grant has? 
((THE COURT: Yes. 
((Q. Did you make an observation of that surface 
to determine the effect that water or moisture 
would have on it. 
((MR. AADNESEN: Objected to as immaterial. 
((THE COURT: That objection will be sustained." 
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CONCLUSION 
There was insufficient evidence adduced at the trial 
to support the verdict for the plaintiff. No affirmative· 
evidence of a slippery condition was introduced and even 
an inference -is fairly rebutted by the scientific measure-
ments and evidence indicating that the terrazzo where 
Mrs. DeWeese fell corresponded in slipperiness to that of 
the sidewalk in front of the store. Further, reasonable 
minds could not differ that the short period of time elaps-
ing from the beginning of precipitation and the fall of 
the plaintiff was not of sufficient duration nor intensity 
to put defendant upon notice of the existence of any con-
dition which might have been hazardous to the plaintiff. 
In fact, all the circumstances, conditions and times are so 
limited that the trial court was required to grant either 
defendant's motion for an involuntary dismissal or de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict. In like manner, 
if any negligence could possibly have been held to have 
existed on the part of the defendant, the trial court should 
have held plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law. 
The persistent and constant attempt by the plaintiff 
to set up the purported actions, customs and conditions 
of W. T. Grant's store in order to establish a standard of 
care by comparison, was highly prejudicial to defendant. 
The error in admitting such evidence was sufficient to 
grant defendant a new trial, even though it appears that 
without such evidence there exists no other evidence of 
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probative value sufficient to support a verdict for the 
plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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